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This article advances our understanding of differences in
hybrid stability by going beyond existing regime typolo-
gies that separate the study of political institutions from
the study of economic institutions. It combines the work of
Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast (NWW)
on varieties of social orders with the literature on political and
economic regime typologies and dynamics to understand
hybrid regimes as Limited Access Orders (LAOs) that differ
in the way dominant elites limit access to political and eco-
nomic resources. Based on a measurement of political and
economic access applied to seven post-Soviet states, the arti-
cle identifies four types of LAOs. Challenging NWW's claim,
it shows that hybrid regimes can combine different degrees of
political and economic access to sustain stability. Our typol-
ogy allows to form theoretical expectations about the kinds of
political and/or economic changes that will move different
types of LAOs toward more openness or closure.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The majority of states today are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic, but stabilized as hybrid
regimes combining elements of democracy and autocracy (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010).
While political scientists developed typologies of political systems (see, for example, Bogaards,
2009; Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Merkel, 2004), political economists analyzed varieties of capitalism
pointing to different state–economy relationships underpinning various regimes (Myant &
Drahokoupil, 2011). However, rarely have these perspectives been merged to generate a typology
that integrates the configurations of political and economic institutions in hybrid regimes.
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An exception is Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast's (NWW) typology of social
orders. They argue that the modern world can be divided into two stable types of social orders. Each
is characterized by a balance of access to economic and political resources, the so-called double bal-
ance: Open Access Orders (OAOs) are marked by open political and economic competition, as
opposed to Limited Access Orders (LAOs) that are dominated by a rent-seeking elite that restricts
access to both economic and political resources (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009).
NWW provide for some differentiation of LAOs into fragile, basic, and mature LAOs, which suffers
from two major weaknesses. First, as this article will show, the threefold distinction has trouble accounting
for many pertinent, and seemingly stable, hybrid regimes that classically feature among LAOs. Second,
NWW do not specify measurements of political and economic access (see also Dellepiane-Avellaneda,
2012), which renders a systematic empirical assessment of the double balance-hypothesis difficult.
Students of transition investigated the interplay of political and economic institutions to explain
transition processes, especially in the post-Soviet space (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; McMann,
2009; Stefes, 2006). They indirectly challenge NWW's double balance-hypothesis by suggesting that
the opening of economic access, for example, through market reforms, may also lead to more rather
than less restrictions of political access (McMann, 2009). While transitologists analyzed the political
and economic processes that underlie transitions, they have so far not suggested a typology of spe-
cific configurations of political and economic institutions that would help to understand the dynamics
underlying hybrid regimes in the spirit of NWW.
This article brings these different perspectives together by conceptualizing hybrid regimes as
LAOs. Unlike NWW's typology and other concepts of hybrid regimes, our typology accounts for
variation in how LAOs structure access to political and economic resources and what combinations
of such access patterns are associated with hybrid (in)stability. The article makes two contributions
to the literature. First, it develops and operationalizes a theoretical heuristic to measure political and
economic access and identifies different types of LAOs empirically. Second, on the basis of a com-
parison of seven post-Soviet states that classically feature among hybrid regimes (Hale, 2015;
Levitsky & Way, 2010), it is argued that there is more than one type of stable social equilibria emerg-
ing in these LAOs. The article identifies four types instead; two of which allow for relatively balanced
forms of access to political and economic resources, but differ in their overall degree of openness or
closure, and two in which this access is unbalanced, allowing either for more access to political than to
economic resources or vice versa. Importantly, the unbalanced “halfway houses” differ in their stabil-
ity: Regimes that are economically more open and politically more closed, such as Armenia between
2005 and 2015, can maintain their basic access structure over a longer period than politically open and
economically closed regimes, exemplified by Georgia between 2004 and 2007.
Understanding these various equilibria is crucial in two ways. First, the finding that multiple equi-
libria of political and economic access provide for relatively stable types of LAOs is important to
advance the theoretical debate on the double balance underlying NWW's theory of social orders. The
presence of multiple equilibria raises the question of what specific thresholds of political and eco-
nomic opening are associated with regime inertia, rather than change.
Second, and unlike most existing conceptualizations of hybrid regimes, our typology shows sys-
tematic variation in how incumbents in hybrid regimes undermine a level playing field by restricting
or opening access to political and economic resources. As other typologies, it allows us to uncover
distinct operating logics of regime types (Bogaards, 2009, p. 413ff.). Importantly, it also helps us to
form expectations about what kind of change is relevant for moving a social order toward more open-
ness or closure: LAOs characterized by a dominant elite that tightly controls access to political
resources, but relaxes control of economic resources, for instance, require systematic changes to
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political access in order to move toward openness. Armenia between 2005 and 2015 demonstrates
why this is far from trivial: While many observers place emphasis on the fight against oligarchs and
thus increasing economic access, our typology suggests that oligarchic market structures are a symp-
tom, not the cause of political closure. A focus on increasing political access in Armenia will conse-
quently be more effective for fostering a higher degree of overall openness moving forward.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 situates the approach of this article in
the literature on transition, regime typologies, and regime dynamics. Section 3 suggests a way to concep-
tualize and measure different degrees of political and economic access. Section 4 presents our refined
typology that is based on this measurement coupled with qualitative illustrations of different types of
post-Soviet LAOs. The conclusion summarizes our results and suggests avenues for further research.
2 | CHALLENGES FOR UNDERSTANDING LIMITED ACCESS
ORDERS
The transition literature can be divided into two research strands: The first develops political and eco-
nomic regime typologies; the second investigates regime dynamics. The political science scholarship on
regime typology focuses on the political fundamentals of regime types. Scholars stress the importance of
free and fair elections, the rule of law, and show how hybrid regimes combine democratic features
(e.g., frequent elections) with autocratic ones (e.g., political repression, political clientelism) (see, for
example, Bogaards, 2009; Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Diamond, 2002; Hale, 2015). Yet, such accounts
predominantly neglect associated economic structures. In turn, students of economic systems rarely cap-
ture associated political structures. The emerging literature on varieties of capitalism in transition econo-
mies, for instance, accounts for different state-economy relationships that affect economic performance
(Myant, 2015; Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011). From this perspective, post-Soviet states vary with regard
to the role of the state in economic affairs, the protection of property rights, and the degree of private
ownership, among others (Myant, 2015; Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011). Yet, these features have not been
systematically linked to the political regime in terms of competition, accountability, and representation.
The limited dialogue between these literatures is striking, in particular with regard to the post-Soviet
space: Scholars demonstrated how the interconnectedness between the political and economic spheres in
the region shapes hybrid (in)stability. Hellman's (1998) seminal article on the origins of partial reforms
showed why states that face weak political competition are less effective economic reformers. Olson
(2000) offered a prominent explanation for why rent-seeking elites become interested in property rights
institutions when faced with increasing political competition. In a similar vein, scholars identified state
capture, clientelism, corruption, and the absence of market-enhancing institutions as key factors affecting
post-Communist regime dynamics (Grzymala-Busse, 2008, 2010; McMann, 2009; Stefes, 2006, 2008):
In the absence of strong regulatory institutions, economic opening through liberalization and deregulation
can arguably lead to political closure (McMann, 2009). Stefes (2008) argues that political control over
corrupt state agencies allows co-opting business elites. In turn, loyal business elites help secure the steady
flow of rents and undermine a level playing field at election times to the incumbent's benefit (see also
Levitsky & Way, 2010). Despite these findings, existing typologies of post-Soviet regimes rarely use the
political economy literature of post-Soviet transition to arrive at theoretically informed expectations
regarding the variation and stability of hybrid regimes. More precisely, they say little about the kind of
political and/or economic change that is likely to move a regime toward more openness or closure, and
how these expectations vary across different types of hybrid regimes.
The article aims at filling this gap drawing on the concept of varieties of social orders by North et al.
(2009). Their concept is based on the hypothesis that economic and political competition sustain each
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other, an interdependence which North et al. (2009, p. 20) call the “double balance”: In OAOs,
unrestricted access and impersonal competition in the economy undermine the abuse of economic
power for political purposes. In turn, political competition and open access to political resources, such
as executive, legislative, and judicial power, prevent the abuse of political power for the manipulation
of the economy. In LAOs, the dominant coalition restricts access to political and economic resources
for private gains. Following the “double balance” logic, the ability of dominant elites to manipulate
elections and to undermine the leveling of the playing field in LAOs depends on their ability to extract
rents thanks to their control over economic resources, such as trade or capital, and vice versa.
Although NWW theorize that there must be a balance between political and economic access,
they do not suggest a measurement that would allow for a systematic empirical evaluation of their
theory. What is more, despite NWW's focus on the interplay between political and economic compe-
tition, their suggested typology of LAOs is not based on different degrees of openness, that is, how
access to political and economic resources is restricted. Instead, NWW differentiate between fragile,
basic, and mature LAOs. From this perspective, LAOs differ in their capacity to monopolize the use
of violence, as well as in the variety and density of public and/or private organizations supported by
the state (North et al., 2009, pp. 41–49).
This differentiation has trouble capturing some central characteristics of regimes that did not fully
transform into OAOs. The literature has labeled them “hybrid,” prominently those regimes in the post-
Soviet space (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010). It is difficult to characterize post-Soviet LAOs
as fragile LAOs: Limited statehood characterizes these countries, but is not constitutive for them.
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova lost control over parts of their territories, for example, but hold the
monopoly over the use of force, and set and enforce collectively binding rules in other parts. Their
capacity to do so may be weak, but limited statehood does not turn them into “failed states” where order
has broken down completely (cf. Risse, Börzel, & Draude, 2018). While fragile LAOs underestimate
the role of the state, basic LAOs, in which organizations, such as courts, are controlled by the state and
where any private organization is a potential threat to dominant coalitions, overestimate it: In autocratic
regimes with a strong “power vertical,” like Russia and Azerbaijan, which come closest to a basic LAO
prototype, private business has developed in the process of post-Communist privatization and liberaliza-
tion, albeit to different degrees. Arguably, the majority of post-Soviet countries, except for Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, could be placed into the “mature LAOs” category, where ruling elites support a vari-
ety of organizations outside the state, which are run by dominant elites. Yet, this categorization neglects
substantial differences in the degree of openness within this grouping.
In sum, NWW provide a convincing theory of the interaction of politics and economics for stabi-
lizing LAOs and OAOs. They, however, are relatively silent on whether LAOs achieve a double bal-
ance between economic and political access to maintain their stability. It is an empirical question
with far-reaching theoretical implications for the literature to what extent some LAOs find stability
without maintaining similar degrees of access in the political and economic sphere, and if so, how
they combine forms of limited and more open access. This knowledge is crucial to understand the
diverse dynamics underlying hybrid stability and to form differentiated expectations about change.
3 | MEASURING DEGREES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ACCESS
This article wants to understand how hybrid regimes, which are conceptualized as LAOs, differ in
structuring access to political and economic resources, what degree of access they allow for, and
whether certain combinations of access are more stable than others, using seven post-Soviet countries
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as an example.1 The stability of regime types is classically defined as the “disposition of a … system
to react in a way to keep its identity” (Garzón Valdés, 1988 cited in Lauth, 2010, p. 29). The identity
of a social order is defined by its distinct configurations of degrees of political and economic access
and (in)stability as (a lack of) changes to these configurations. In order to provide a theoretical heu-
ristic and an empirical measurement of these configurations, this analysis relies on the literature of
political regime types for assessing political access and on the literature on transition economies for
economic access.
While North et al. (2009, pp. 111–147) refer to democratic processes, the rule of law, and compet-
itive parties that structure political access, scholars working on varieties of political regimes have
substantially advanced our understanding of access to political resources (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius &
Teorell, 2007; Merkel, 2004). In line with this literature, this article broadly distinguishes between
more formal and more informal institutions that grant or restrict access to political resources.
In a more formal institutionalist perspective, Merkel (2004) identifies five partial regimes that are
constitutive for embedded liberal democracies. Next to the electoral regime based on free and fair
elections, these are the presence of political rights (i.e., the right to freedom of speech and opinion,
right of association, free media), horizontal accountability (i.e., the executive's control through parlia-
ments, judiciary, and other institutions, such as party apparatus), civil rights (i.e., equality before the
law), and the effective power to rule (i.e., control of the military and police). Schmotz (2017) draws
on Merkel to develop the concept of an “embedded autocracy.” While any regime that does not hold
democratic elections is an autocracy, Schmotz notes variation in the way autocratic regimes operate
with regard to other partial regimes, that is, how they restrict civil liberties and political rights, and
constrain horizontal accountability in order to undermine political competition.2 Drawing upon Merkel
(2004) and Schmotz (2017), this article defines access to political resources as the extent to which various
partial regimes constrain political competition in such a more formal institutional setting. As Table 1
shows, we use well-established indicators to measure the quality of elections, horizontal accountability,
and the protection of political and civil rights in order to account for the degree of access to executive,
legislative, and judicial power in the spirit of NWW.
The literature on neopatrimonialism reveals, however, that even if formal open access institutions
are in place, informal practices may undermine or complement their functioning. State capture, for
instance, often undermines democratic development and sustains authoritarian rule, irrespective of
formally established impartial institutions (Grzymala-Busse, 2008, 2010). In order to measure politi-
cal access, such informal, neopatrimonial institutions have to be taken into account. In neo-
patrimonial regimes, the persistence of patron-client relationships allows for rent extraction at all
levels of authority (Gel'man, 2016). In the absence of a legal-rational bureaucracy, members of the
dominant elite use public resources for private gain through informal networks. Neopatrimonial
regimes also vary with regard to more formal institutions outlined earlier, such as the degree of elite
competition and the concentration of power to organize access to patronage (Erdmann, 2013; Fisun,
2012). This study measures the degree of neopatrimonialism in its subcomponents of clientelism
(indicator: vote buying), and regime corruption (judicial corruption, legislative corruption, executive
embezzlement, executive bribery) to assess the prevalence of neopatrimonial practices empirically
(cf. Sigman & Lindberg, 2017). A measure of public sector corruption is also included. While corrupt
public sector workers may not be directly linked to those elected or appointed to office, their prac-
tices facilitate the limitation of access to economic resources (e.g., through business registrations).
In the economic sphere, this article draws on the literature on transition economies to define two
concepts that help account for varieties of economic access: the role of the state and the power of
market-enhancing institutions. With regard to the first, Myant and Drahokoupil (2011) differentiate



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ADEMMER ET AL. 7
between post-Soviet transition economies, where the state holds most of the economic assets, and
controls funding opportunities for businesses; and economies where private ownership of large
shares of economic assets exists alongside close links between state and business (see also Myant,
2015). In a similar vein, McMann (2009) defines the degree of privatization, liberalization, and
deregulation as key to reducing state involvement and providing private actors with opportunities to
access economic resources, such as land, labor, capital, and other activities, including trade
(cf. North et al., 2009, p. 30). Further, McMann points to the importance of market-enhancing institu-
tions in bringing about conditions of economic competition, including property rights. In the absence
of such market-enhancing institutions, reforms that reduce economic state intervention rather risk
proliferating informal institutions, such as clientelism and bribes (McMann, 2009). To capture the
degree of access to economic resources, the degree of state intervention in the economy is measured
by the presence of interests groups, the extent to which trade and banking is liberalized and privatiza-
tion progressed. Further, this study assesses the functioning of market-enhancing institutions by
the degree of market competition, the protection of property rights, and the quality of antimonopoly
policies. Table 1 details all variables used to measure political and economic access alongside
summary statistics for the post-Soviet sample (Table 2). We discuss how we merge them into distinct
measurements of political and economic access next.
While theory tells us how to measure political and economic access in general, there is no theoret-
ical argument to inform how, that is, with what weight, the individual variables should be aggregated
to measure the degree of political or economic access prevailing in a certain country. Being interested
in capturing the variation in political and economic access in hybrid regimes, this analysis proceeds
as common in the construction of indices (see, for example, Dreher, 2006; Mungiu-Pippidi &
Dadašov, 2016) and defines such weights with the help of principal component analysis (PCA). PCA
reduces all variables in a data set into different orthogonal dimensions—so called principal
components—that are linear weighted combinations of the original variables and designed to capture
a maximum of variance of the data set (Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006).3 Separate PCAs of our politi-
cal and economic access variables are performed using standardized data for the sample of seven
post-Soviet states from 2005 to 2015: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and
Ukraine.4 The weights identified through the respective first components (see Table A2) are
employed to construct two new variables that we call political and economic access. These variables
TABLE 2 List of countries (full sample, by region, 2005–2015)
Central Asia (CtrA) Post-Soviet sample New EU MS (NMS) Western Balkan (WB)
Kazakhstan Georgia (GEO) Estonia Albania
Kyrgyzstana Ukraine (UKR) Czech Republic Serbiab
Uzbekistan Azerbaijan (AZ) Bulgaria Macedonia
Tajikistan Armenia (AM) Romania





Note: Countries for which variable values are based on less than three VDem expert assessments are excluded from the sample.
aMissing values for executiveconstr in the transition phase of Kyrgyzstan in 2010 have been interpolated.
bValues for 2005 extrapolated.
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have a mean of zero in the post-Soviet sample, which allows us to interpret positive or negative deviations
from this joint zero mean as indicative of more or less access to political or economic resources. This also
allows us to assess these LAOs in relation to each other, as opposed to some OAO standard, and reveal
variation in how LAOs restrict political and economic competition.
The PCA for political access shows that the first principal component accounts for 64% of the vari-
ance and is most strongly defined by variables that capture the prevalence of free and fair elections,
political rights, and horizontal accountability. This suggests that formal political institutions identified
by the literature on democracy and autocracy account for most of the variation in political access
between LAOs in our data set. The second most important component of political access captures an
additional 24% of variation in the data set and is most strongly associated with corruption indicators,
representing the informal dimension that relates to the literature on neopatrimonialism. The first compo-
nent used to generate the economic access variable accounts for 61% of the variation and is most
strongly associated with property rights protection and the extent to which private enterprises are
permitted, fundamentals of market-based competition have been established, and trade and banking
have been liberalized. The measure of economic access is thus strongly associated with variables that
capture both the role of the state and certain market-enhancing institutions, such as property rights. The
second component resulting from the PCA of economic access captures less additional variance (18%)
and is almost exclusively defined by our indicator of antimonopoly policy.
Hence, in order to best discriminate between and thus identify types of LAOs among post-Soviet
states, it is necessary to analyze variation in formal political institutions, including free and fair elec-
tions, horizontal accountability, and political rights, as well as the variation associated with the role
of the state in the economy and property rights protection. After having established the theoretical
heuristic and the empirical measurement of political and economic access, the article now turns to
analyzing the configurations of degrees of political and economic access and their (in)stability.
4 | TOWARD A REFINED TYPOLOGY OF LIMITED ACCESS
ORDERS
What configurations of political and economic access emerge in the post-Soviet space if measured
this way? Is there a balance between political and economic access as theorized by NWW? Or is
economic opening also associated with political closure, as suggested by McMann (2009)? In order
to understand how this structure of access varies across a broader sample of countries, the suggested
political and economic access measures are calculated for a larger sample of 24 countries (using the
post-Soviet sample weights), additionally comprising nine Central and East European new member
states (NMS), five post-Soviet countries from Central Asia (CtrA), and three countries from the
Western Balkans (WB) (Table 2).
Figure 1 shows averages for these samples and specific periods in which states in the post-Soviet
sample were governed by different dominant coalitions that we identified based on Hale's (2015)
work on patronal politics, coupled with country expert assessments.5 Figure 1 suggests a noticeable
double balance: NMS combine a high degree of economic access with a high degree of political access.
Western Balkan states have medium degrees of political and economic access, and states in Central Asia
combine limited access to political resources with limited access to economic ones. Hence, on average,
economic access and political access go together in this larger sample of countries. Still, many post-
Soviet countries are located in an area of hybridity. The analysis delves deeper into the specific combi-
nations of degrees of access for this sample next.
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Figure 2 shows the configurations of political and economic access in the seven post-Soviet
countries. It displays patterned differences in the way they restrict access to political and economic
resources. Relative to their post-Soviet peers, some dominant coalitions sustain a double balance and
allow for similarly more or less access in both the political and economic sphere [(1) and (4)]. Others
structure access in an unbalanced way and allow for greater access in only one area [(2) and (3)].
This results in four distinct configurations of political and economic access that characterize social
orders in these hybrid regimes. They are labeled “balanced openness” (1), “balanced closure”(4),
“unbalanced openness”(2), and “unbalanced closure”(3) orders (Table 3). Note that the Type 3
configuration is labeled unbalanced closure, as it provides on average for slightly less access than the
unbalanced openness (Type 2) order. In addition, this label originates in the fact that political access
captures more variation between the LAOs in our data set (Table A1).
As any typology, these four types bundle a number of complex empirical phenomena to describe
patterned variation (Lauth, 2003). Next to showing these diverse combinations of access, this article
aims to provide insights into the distinct operating logics of these different configurations of political
FIGURE 1 Relationship
between political and
economic access (full sample)
FIGURE 2 Configurations of
limited access (post-Soviet sample)
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and economic access, and the corresponding patterns of stability. Toward this end, these configurations
are illustrated with examples of each type of LAO in the next subsection. To demonstrate their
relevance, the resulting expectations for making orders move further toward opening or closure are
discussed.
4.1 | Type 4: Balanced closure
The simultaneity of massive limits to political and economic resources is characteristic of the operat-
ing logic of “balanced closure” orders. They are marked by the absence of free and fair elections, a
lack of horizontal accountability and political rights, combined with an all-dominating role of the
ruling elite in the economic sphere.
Belarus is a case in point. The process of increasing political closure has its roots in 1994, when
Alyaksandr Lukashenka became president. Ever since, elections in Belarus are deemed as neither
free nor fair. Lukashenka started to control the media and to consolidate the control of all sources of
political power, undermining horizontal accountability to the judiciary and the parliament. In 1996,
Lukashenka pushed through changes in the constitution, which allowed the president to issue decrees
to override existing legislation. At the same time, he started to increasingly restrict the independence
of various political parties whose representatives had taken an active stance against these constitu-
tional changes (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
In the economic realm, Lukashenka ensured that the institutional framework for market competition
would remain weak. Belarusian state authorities have been interfering with private sector development,
including in the banking sector, since he came to power. As a result, Belarus remains largely a non-
market economy (Dabrowski, 2016). Privatization is de facto dependent on presidential consent and state
ownership of production means is used to keep unemployment low and wages high, with seemingly dis-
ciplined fiscal policies to guarantee a high level of social spending (Yarashevich, 2014, p. 1717).
The drastic limits of access to political and economic resources are mutually reinforcing and are asso-
ciated with stability during our period of observation (2005–2015): As privatization is strongly contingent
of the control of the president, for instance, the opposition is deprived of an important source of funding.
Hence, economic closure limits political competition in Belarus (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 206). This
general operating logic has not been challenged by the slight economic opening from 2011 onward that
is shown by the data in Figure 2. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Belarus engaged in a slow
private sector liberalization and formally improved its property registration to give boost to economic
growth. Its implementation in practice, however, is incoherent and subject to state interference if authori-
ties' interests are at stake (BTI, 2016b). In turn, severe restrictions of political competition put the
TABLE 3 Four types of Limited Access Orders
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dominant elite under Lukashenka in a powerful position that allows it to limit access to basic economic
resources, such as property and trade, and vice versa.
Our typology leads us to expect that a system whose operating logic tightly combines highly
restrictive access to political and economic resources is unlikely to change in a gradual way, as grad-
ual opening in one area, for example, economics, will not be supported by the openness of the
respective other area, for example, politics. What is more, balanced closure types also imply that the
room for promoting political and economic opening from the outside may be fairly limited, as there
are no domestic “hooks” that external actors may exploit given that both the economic and political
spheres are firmly controlled.
4.2 | Type 3: Unbalanced closure
The operating logic of “unbalanced closure” orders is marked by a mutually enforcing pattern of
strong limits to political access, combined with—for LAOs—relatively high degrees of economic
access: While elections, political rights, and horizontal accountability remain highly flawed or
severely restricted, unbalanced closure orders allow for more access to economic resources with view
to private sector safeguards and the role of the state in the economy, for example, with regard to trade
and banking liberalization.
Armenia figures in this category from 2005 to 2015. Despite the fact that multiple political parties
have been founded since Armenia's independence in 1991, political competition has been drastically
limited inter alia by vote-buying, and the use of administrative resources favoring the ruling domi-
nant coalition (BTI, 2016a). Unlike in neighboring Georgia, where electoral competition has
increased since 2003, elections in Armenia have thus only had limited influence for deciding about
the governing authority (BTI, 2016a, 2016c). Moreover, the executive's systematic interference with
the judiciary undermined horizontal accountability (BTI, 2016a; Paturyan & Stefes, 2017). Since the
early 1990s, dominant coalitions also used a well-organized security apparatus to suppress regime
opposition by violating political rights and civil liberties (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Stefes, 2006). In
political terms, Armenia hence qualifies as a severely closed regime.
Economically, however, Armenia has opened up since the late 1990s. An increasing trade deficit
and the prospect of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) made the new dominant
coalition under President Robert Kocharian, who had won the 1998 presidential elections based on
massive manipulation (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 201 f.), pursue liberal policies toward trade, invest-
ments, and capital (Rutland, 1998, p. 364). What is more, the government worked toward improving
the business climate for private firms, albeit with ambivalent results. While registration procedures
became less burdensome, state control over tax reporting by small businesses remains significant (BTI,
2012, 2016a). Notwithstanding, up until 2007, Armenia has been more open with respect to liberaliza-
tion policies and the protection of property rights than Moldova, Ukraine, and even Georgia, making it
one “of the most open economies among former Soviet states” (BTI, 2008b, p. 14). These initial liberal-
ization reforms supported massive growth and—to some degree—poverty reduction in Armenia (Mitra
et al., 2007, p. xx). This form of economic openness coupled with high degrees of political closure has
been mutually reinforcing in the case of Armenia. In line with McMann (2009), Armenia's unbalanced
closure order has manifested itself as relatively stable halfway house over a decade, combining political
closure with specific economic opening in the form of liberalization and privatization.
While our typology suggests that limits in access to political resources are most indicative of closure
of Armenia's social order, many observers of Armenia might instead refer to the striking monopolization
of the Armenian economy in politically viable sectors. Yet, developments in Armenia suggest that this
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monopolization is a result—rather than the root cause—of the combination of political closure and eco-
nomic liberalization that our typology points us to. To illustrate, when privatization in Armenia started
in the mid-1990s, the political elite used it to cement its power, as state-owned enterprises in strategic
sectors were sold to allies of then President Ter-Petrossian, while small businesses were sold en masse
but suffered immensely from unofficial government activity in taxation or customs (Bremmer & Welt,
1997; Stefes, 2006). As a result, cartels and monopolies, often connected to the dominant coalition,
undermined de facto competition in key sectors of the economy (BTI, 2012). Interestingly, however,
the process of a partial demonopolization, which emerged since 2010 in response to the 2008 financial
crisis and EU requirements during negotiations over an Association Agreement (Grigoryan, 2017), did
not promote, but rather stabilized the lack of political competition. Jointly with a constitutional change
toward a proportional voting system, the dominant elite used demonopolization to strip some regionally
influential oligarchs off their assets, forcing them to take a cooperative stance toward the ruling elite to
avoid tax controls (Liakov, 2017). This suggests that in order to move unbalanced closure orders toward
more openness, access to political resources needs to be increased—a prerequisite for the impartial
enforcement of antimonopoly legislation.
In the case of Armenia, the jury is still out on whether the Velvet Revolution led by the former
journalist and protest leader Nikol Pashinyan leads to such greater access to political resources.
While the public focus has been prominently on the fight against oligarchs in the aftermath of the
Velvet Revolution, our typology suggests that external and domestic actors should focus on reforms
that are designed to change access to political resources, as the overall development of Armenia's
social order will crucially depend on whether the new authorities ensure that this access is granted
widely and on an impartial basis.
4.3 | Type 2: Unbalanced openness
LAOs operating under the logic of “unbalanced openness” combine restricted access to economic
resources with relatively high degrees of political access. Compared to unbalanced closure orders,
unbalanced openness types of LAOs allow for comparatively more access to political resources, includ-
ing elections, political rights, and/or horizontal accountability, but are marked by more severe restric-
tions with regard to the state's involvement in the economy, as well as property rights protection.
To illustrate this operating logic, the analysis zooms into the case of Georgia from 2004 to 2007.
Under former President Eduard Shevardnadze, the civil society had developed, but political competition
at the ballot box remained fraudulent (Tudoroiu, 2007). After the Rose Revolution of 2003 that brought
Mikheil Saakashvili to power, Georgia has witnessed higher competition for political resources
(Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 227): The 2004 elections were characterized as relatively free and fair and
their administration constituted a significant improvement to previous elections (BTI, 2008a). While
Georgia differs substantially from Armenia or Belarus in this respect, the electoral improvements did
not make Georgia an OAO: Mikheil Saakashvili's rise to power was accompanied by a concentration of
power in the presidential apparatus and a weakening of the parliament (Papava, 2009). The country also
still lacked a political opposition and a fully independent judiciary (Freedom House, 2006).
Economic competition remained highly limited. This was partially due to the legacy of Shevard-
nadze, under whom structural deficits and regulations, such as the issuing of import licenses, distorted
economic competition, and thus lowered the starting point for the new government (BTI, 2006)—in
contrast to Armenia where the dominant elite supported liberalization of trade and capital and improve-
ments in property rights protection from the late 1990s onward (BTI, 2008b; Rutland, 1998).
Saakashvili embraced a business-friendly agenda that included a massive deregulation of the economy
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and privatization programs, but took some time to be implemented on the ground. Simultaneously,
though, the new authorities engaged in processes of “deprivatization” (Papava, 2009, p. 203), in which
the government forced owners to hand over property privatized prior to the Rose Revolution to the state,
and resold it. The government drastically infringed property rights, intervened with tax audits, and pres-
sured businesses into contributing to extra-budgetary accounts to grant favors to Saakashvili's political
allies or punish political opponents (Wetzinger, 2017). The case of Georgia demonstrates, however, that
this type of order was not particularly stable: Georgia shifted toward a balanced openness order in 2008.
Our typology points out that while access to political competition increased in Georgia, economic
access did not in the direct aftermath of the Rose Revolution. Developments in the economic sphere were
instead indicative of the prevailing elite corruption in Georgia (Papava, 2009). This observation differs
from assessments at the time that were mostly intrigued by Saakashvili's free market rhetoric and the fight
against lower level corruption (Freedom House, 2006), as well as those preoccupied with the need for
improving horizontal accountability in the political sphere (Hale, 2016). Our typology instead points to
the fact that Saakashvili used the limits to economic resources to undermine a level-playing field making
it distinct from Armenia, where the dominant elite used its privileged access to political resources to
weaken political opponents and/or strengthen its allies. Our typology thus leads us to expect that domestic
and external strategies aimed at securing impartial access to economic resources in Georgia's unbalanced
openness order are required to induce increasing overall levels of openness.
4.4 | Type 1: Balanced openness
The operational logic underlying “balanced openness” LAOs is based on the simultaneity of a rela-
tively large degree of political and economic access. While political access is roughly comparable to
the “unbalanced openness” cases, degrees of economic access are higher. The analysis zooms into the
case of Georgia from 2008 to 2015 to illustrate the operational logic of a balanced openness order.
In terms of political access, concerns about Saakashvili's tendency to concentrate power increased
after 2007. The violent clash with protestors in November 2007, and problems associated with the
2008 parliamentary and presidential elections sparked strong criticism (Freedom House, 2011).
While the electoral process improved in the 2010 local elections (Freedom House, 2011), the domi-
nant coalition only faced mounting political competition with the rise of billionaire Bidzina
Ivanishvili, who managed to unite various opposition parties in the coalition Georgian Dream.
Ivanishvili won the 2012 parliamentary elections, representing the first peaceful change in power via
elections and a major demonstration of the relatively high degree of political access in Georgia.
In terms of economic access, privatization programs were close to be completed and the abolition
of many business regulations contributed to Georgia's steep rise in the World Bank's Ease of Doing
Business Index from 2006 to 2008 (BTI, 2010). Formal rules of governing economic competition,
which the Sakashvili government introduced in the immediate aftermath of the Rose Revolution,
hence showed signs of being enforced on the ground during the time period (BTI, 2016c). In addi-
tion, pressure by the IMF had made the government abandon extra-budgetary accounts in 2006
(Papava, 2009). Such changes widened economic access for businesses in comparison to the early
2000s. Still, Georgia remained an LAO, as property rights violations remained widespread and
deregulation had sensitive side effects, such as a drastic reduction of labor rights (Papava, 2009).
Georgia illustrates well the operating dynamic of this type of LAO. When faced with mounting
political competition from Ivanishvili, an individual with abundant access to economic resources, the
government—arguably selectively—enforced campaign financing laws that led to large fines, and in
case of nonpayment, triggered seizures of bank accounts, businesses and property of Ivanishvili and
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his supporters, some of which were then cheaply auctioned to supporters of the government
(Fairbanks & Gugushvili, 2013, p. 121). Yet, the government did not ban Ivanishvili from participat-
ing or manipulate the election, arguably because it feared domestic and international scrutiny of the
electoral process (Fairbanks & Gugushvili, 2013, p. 121). Ivanishvili's access to economic resources
allowed him to use the relatively high degree of political access to gain power.
Our typology suggests that this specific type of LAO reached a degree of political and economic
competition that facilitated peaceful changes of power via elections. While these developments may
suggest that the “balanced openness” order is likely to be the first step toward transition to OAO, they
seem relatively stable over time: None of the countries included in our analysis lapsed back into
“unbalanced openness,”, but the degree of political and economic openness has not continuously
increased over time either (Figure 2). While balanced openness orders provide a variety of hooks for
domestic and external actors to move the respective social order further toward openness, this would
require addressing the remaining limits to economic and political access in a targeted way. Our typol-
ogy leads us to expect that without the encompassing empowerment of actors committed to open access
both in the political and economic sphere, we expect the balanced openness orders to stay LAOs.
5 | CONCLUSION
Transitologists traditionally stressed the importance of the interplay of economic and political institu-
tions to understand regime dynamics. Yet, scholars working on typologies of political or economic
regimes rarely investigated what configurations of political and economic institutions generate
regime (in)stability. An exception is the work by NWW on the “double-balance” according to which
political and economic competition sustain each other and result in either LAOs or OAOs. This work
has trouble, however, capturing some of the most pertinent hybrid regimes. The applicability of the
typology has additionally been constrained by a lack of clear measurement for political and economic
access. Drawing on NWW, as well as the literature on regime typologies and regime transitions, this
article developed and operationalized a theoretical framework to measure access to political and eco-
nomic resources. It asked how LAOs differ in the way they structure political and economic access
and what combinations of such access are associated with hybrid stability.
Conducting an empirical comparison of political and economic access in seven post-Soviet states,
we identified four types of LAOs that characterize this set of hybrid regimes. Two allow for rela-
tively balanced forms of access to political and economic resources. In the other two, this access is
unbalanced, allowing either for more access to political resources than to economic resources or they
pose fewer limits on accessing economic resources than political ones. The article finds that orders
that restrict access to political resources while allowing for economic access are more stable than
those that allow political access, but restrict economic access.
What are the implications of this typology for our understanding of hybrid stability? The typology ques-
tions the equilibrium hypothesis of the “double balance” and shows that hybrid regimes do not necessarily
combine similar degrees of access in the political and economic sphere to sustain stability. Armenia repre-
sents the “unbalanced closure” type allowing for some economic access despite its political closure during
the period under observation. This indicates that greater economic competition does not necessarily result in
greater political activity of entrepreneurs, as NWW as well as proponents of modernization theory would
have theorized (cf. Lipset, 1959; North et al., 2009). The cases of unbalanced openness have shown that an
increase in political competition is associated with more economic competition relatively soon.
In addition, our typology demonstrates how hybrid regimes systematically vary in how they
restrict or open access to political and economic resources. The article uncovered the distinct
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operating logics of each type of order and developed expectations about what kind of political and/or
economic change was relevant for moving a social order toward more openness or closure. The analysis
showed, for instance, that Armenia and Georgia—often lumped together as a single form of hybrid
regime—vary in this regard. Dominant coalitions in Armenia have for a long time used their privileged
access to political resources to weaken political opponents, while Saakashvili in Georgia exploited the
limited access to economic resources to undermine a level playing field. It is thus hypothesized that
today's Armenia would especially require systematic changes to political access in order to move toward
openness rather than a limited focus on the fight against oligarchs. In contrast, our typology suggests that
changing regime dynamics in post-Saakashvili Georgia are best understood by analyzing changes in the
degree of economic access. Future research can build on insights from this typology, and systematically
investigate the causes for the shifts identified within and across types of LAOs, test our hypotheses as
regards the conditions under which political and economic openness become more likely, and scrutinize
what sequencing of reforms and what domestic and international support is needed toward that end.
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ENDNOTES
1 Replication material can be accessed through the institutional website of the author, Esther Ademmer.
2 Previous typologies of autocratic regimes distinguish different forms of organization (Geddes, 1999; see also
Hadenius & Teorell, 2007), for example, between military and party autocracies. We draw on Schmotz’ typology of
defective autocracies because we are more interested in identifying variation in defects and associated restrictions of
political access, than in developing a typology of LAOs that differentiates between forms of organizations.
3 After having rescaled all variables so that a numerical increase of each indicator represents an increase in openness
(see, for example, Dreher, 2006), we implement separate PCAs for the analysis of political and economic access. A
robustness check with a joint assessment of both areas is available upon request.
4 By the early 2000s, countries in the post-Soviet space—except for the three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania—were defined as hybrid regimes (Diamond, 2002) that were stuck in transition. Coupled with data avail-
ability reasons, the analysis therefore starts in 2005.
5 We label dominant coalitions according to their start and end dates, even when they started before the period covered
by our data to facilitate interpretation. Empirical observations for a dominant coalition from 2004 to 2008, for
instance, are based on data covering 2005–2008.
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